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The famous British historian A. J. P. Taylor described Mussolini as a “vain, 
blundering boaster without either ideas or aims”. In respect of Mussolini’s 
foreign policy, however, this assessment can be disputed. Even Taylor him-
self goes on to add: “Fascist foreign policy repudiated from the outset the 
principles of Geneva.” If there is a single area of Mussolini’s activities where 
he demonstrated ideas, aims and indeed consistency, it is to be related to It-
aly’s foreign policy from  when he assumed power. He proved this very 
quickly, in , when his ﬂeet bombarded Corfu, blaming this incident on a 
completely innocent Greek government and showing utter contempt for the 
League of Nations which he was known to consider as an ‘academic’ organi-
zation. Among his bombastic early declarations stands out the one in which 
he argued that treaties were not eternal, that they were not irrevocable.
Mussolini’s early foreign policy aimed, somewhat implausibly given 
the awesome naval power of Britain and France (notwithstanding their ri-
valry), at making the Mediterranean Italy’s mare nostrum. But the ambi-
tion was real enough, founded as it was on Mussolini’s vision of creating 
“a new Roman Empire”, something which could only mean aggrandize-
ment, peaceful or not, in Africa and the Balkans. As regards the Balkans, 
Mussolini’s policy was bound to bring Italy into an early dispute with the 
newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, just across the 
Adriatic. Already referred to as “Yugoslavia” even before the oﬃcial change 
of its name in , the country had clashed with Italy at the Paris Peace 
Conference over the so-called “Adriatic Question” in which Italy had de-
manded from the Allies (in the secret Treaty of London) large chunks in 
the eastern Adriatic as a reward for her entry into the war in . But 
President Woodrow Wilson, known for opposing secret treaties, would have 
none of that and Italy became, even before the advent of the Fascist regime, 
 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Ltd, ), .
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a revisionist power seeking to improve on its “mutilated victory”. In  
France and Britain came up with a proposal that would form part of a 
general ‘compromise’ to resolve the Adriatic Question whereby northern 
Albania should become an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, Greece be-
ing rewarded generously in the south, with the remainder becoming Italy’s 
mandated area. But President Wilson predictably objected.
The Adriatic Question dragged on for a while, but a signiﬁcant 
achievement was reached in  when Italy and Yugoslavia signed the 
Treaty of Rapallo which settled the frontier between the two countries, 
although the disputed city of Fiume continued to constitute a problem. This 
matter was solved in January  when the Yugoslav prime minister Niko-
la Pašić signed with Mussolini the Pact of Rome by which Italy received 
Fiume and its port. But the Pact also contained an undertaking that Italy 
and Yugoslavia should in the event of international complications consult 
together before either country took measures likely to aﬀect the interests of 
the other. This, as will be seen, was to prove a highly contentious issue be-
tween Italy and Yugoslavia. Another signiﬁcant diplomatic development in 
the early s was the establishment of what became known as “The Little 
Entente”, a series of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav-Romanian defensive conven-
tions, concluded between August  and June , and aimed against 
the revisionism of the defeated Hungary and Bulgaria. This series of treaties 
was strongly backed by France. Italy, in fact, also had a good reason to sup-
port the Little Entente as it certainly did not wish to see a restoration of the 
Habsburg Empire, though its subsequent policy proved very diﬀerent as it 
was to extend support to Hungary and Bulgaria. What brought Italy on a 
collision course with Yugoslavia, however, was the Albanian question.
 For an early account of this question, see Edward James Woodhouse and Chase Go-
ing Woodhouse, Italy and the Jugoslavs (Boston: Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press, 
). See also Dragan R. Živojinović, America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (-
), (New York: Columbia University Press, East European Quarterly, Boulder, 
); Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, ); and René Albrecht-Carrié, 
Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, ). 
 See C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe: A History (Lon-
don: Macmillan, ), .
 See Robert Machray, The Little Entente (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., ). 
 See Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska - (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu 
istoriju, ), and the same author’s Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva rata (Belgrade: 
Institut za savremenu istoriju, ).
 Among contemporary British, almost uncritically pro-Albanian accounts, the follow-
ing should be mentioned: J. Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (London: Williams & 
Norgate Ltd., ); Ronald Matthews, Sons of the Eagle: Wanderings in Albania (Lon-
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Now, just as Belgium had been seen historically by Britain as a country of 
the utmost strategic importance – as Napoleon had remarked, the city of 
Antwerp being a pistol pointed at the heart of England – “Albania has been 
deﬁned as the Italian Belgium.” This actually made a lot of sense. With 
a highly indented eastern Adriatic coast, not to mention the unparalleled 
possibilities of stationing major naval forces in the Gulf of Cattaro, Italy 
had a legitimate strategic interest in preventing a major power establishing 
itself across the Adriatic with only so few nautical miles away from its prac-
tically defenceless eastern shores. It was thus not without reason that Italy 
had been against Austria’s attack on Serbia in . For this was serious 
political and military business, entirely understood by the Italian politicians 
who negotiated the secret Treaty of London. Concerning Albania, Article 
 of the Treaty stipulated: “Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, 
the island of Saseno and surrounding territory of suﬃcient extent to assure 
defence of these points.” Article  further stipulated: “Should Italy obtain 
the Trentino and Istria … together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands 
… and if the central portion of Albania be reserved for the establishment 
of a small autonomous neutralized state, Italy shall not oppose the division 
of northern and southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece 
should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. Italy shall be charged 
with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign 
powers…”
don: Methuen & Co. Ltd., ); J. Swire, King Zog’s Albania (London: Robert Hale 
and Company, ); and Nigel Heseltine, Scarred Background: A Journey through Alba-
nia (London: Lovat Dickinson Limited, ). To this should be added contemporary 
British pro-Fascist works such as that by Ion S. Munro, Through Fascism to World Power
(London: Alexander Maclehose & Co., ). A pro-Yugoslav British work, which 
unfortunately stops in , is that by Henry Baerlin, A Diﬃcult Frontier (Yugoslavs and 
Albanians), (London: Leonard Parsons, ). For a sympathetic contemporary Serbian 
view of Zogu, accompanied by a sharp criticism of Belgrade’s policy towards Albania, see 
Milosav Jelić, Albanija: zapisi o ljudima i događajima (Belgrade: Geca Kon, ). Most
modern accounts understandably concentrate on Kosovo rather than Albania proper. 
Two useful works are Nicolas J. Costa, Albania: A European Enigma (New York: East 
European Monographs, ), and Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A modern History
(London: I. B. Tauris, ). See also Ramadan Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians 
(London: C. Hurst and Company, ). Noel Macolm’s celebrated Kosovo: A Short 
History (London: Macmillan, ), which covers Albania to a considerable extent, is 
remarkable only by its grotesque distortions, presumably motivated by the author’s well-
known anti-Serbian views. This “work” is best left to gather dust on bookshelves.
 Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy –
 (London: Oxford University Press, ), .
 Quoted in George Slocombe, The Dangerous Sea: The Mediterranean and its Future 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., ), .
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Thus Italy cannot be accused of exaggerated greed regarding Albania: it 
merely sought to obtain there a small client state, a bridgehead for some 
future expansion in the region, while the rest of the country could be con-
veniently divided between its small Balkan neighbours precisely in order to 
keep any stronger powers out. What, however, the Italians failed to envisage 
in  was that a potentially strong Yugoslavia would emerge at the end 
of the war. And if Italy had valid reasons to bring Albania into its sphere 
of inﬂuence, so did Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia. In the ﬁrst place, 
since its creation in , Albania proved Europe’s most unstable coun-
try, something that Belgrade could not contemplate with equanimity. And 
second, the Serbian province of Kosovo, bordering on Albania, contained a 
large population of ethnic Albanians deeply hostile to the Serbs. Already 
in , before they were forced to retreat in the face of the combined 
Austrian-German-Bulgarian onslaught, the Serbs had successfully invaded 
Albania where they received at least a partial welcome.
Hardly surprising, then, that Belgrade was always going to take a 
deep interest in the chronically chaotic aﬀairs of Albania. The country had 
changed government no fewer than six times between  and . Its 
ﬁrst head of state, the young and hopelessly incompetent Prince Wilhelm 
of Wied, abandoned his new country after only six months in September 
, never to return again to such a hotbed of cloak and dagger politics.
The Serbs had, already during the First World War, an important ally in Al-
bania. This was Essad Pasha Toptani who had declared himself President at 
Durazzo. His chief domestic rival was Ahmed Bey Zogu, a political oppor-
 The Kosovo Albanians had established a “Kosovo Committee” with a military wing 
(the so-called kaçak movement), carrying acts of violence against the Serbs.
 The French used to describe Albania thus: Pays balkanique, pays volcanique. For a mas-
sive documentary background to Serb (and Yugoslav)–Albanian relations, see Ljubod-
rag Dimić and Djordje Borozan, eds., Jugoslovenska država i Albanci,  vols. (Belgrade: 
Službeni list SRJ, vol. I, , vol. II, ). See also Emilija Aleksić, ed., Iz istorije 
Albanaca (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika SR Srbije, ); Djoko Slijepčević, 
Srpsko-arbanaški odnosi kroz vekove sa posebnim osvrtom na novije vreme, th rev. ed. 
(Himmelsthür [W. Germany], ); Radovan Samardžić et al., Kosovo i Metohija u 
srpskoj istoriji (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, ); Dušan T. Bataković, The
Kosovo Chronicles (Belgrade: Plato, ); Djordje Borozan, Velika Albanija: porijeklo, 
ideje, praksa (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut VJ, ); Miodrag Marović, Balkanski
džoker: Istorijska hronika nastajanja i razvoja albanskog pitanja (Bar: JP Kulturni centar, 
); Dimitrije Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu, th ed. (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga and 
Vojnoizdavački zavod, ); and Sreten Draškić, Evropa i albansko pitanje (Belgrade: 
Mala biblioteka SKZ, ).
 The majority Muslim Albanian population harboured suspicions of this Protestant 
prince.
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tunist of the ﬁrst rank, a true “aﬁcionado of the art of realpolitik” who, just 
like Toptani, was not above oﬀering his political services to Serbia. Toptani 
was in  forced to ﬂee to Italy, thus leaving Zogu to ﬁll the gap which 
he did by ingratiating himself to the occupying Austrians who awarded him 
the rank of Colonel and apparently also gave him gold to ﬁnance battles 
against the Italians who had landed with their forces in the southern port 
of Valona in the south claiming compensation for the Austrian invasion of 
Serbia. But during the First World War, although Albania was formally 
neutral, the country had no government as such, and it was only in January 
 that a provisional administration came into existence at the Congress 
of Lushnjë. Zogu became the interior minister and commander in chief of 
the army. In the same year Albania became a member of the League of Na-
tions. In November  the Conference of Ambassadors (Britain, France, 
Italy and Japan) made a curious but in any case pragmatic decision whereby 
it recognized that any violation of the frontiers or independence of Alba-
nia might constitute a danger for the strategic safety of Italy, and agreed 
that, should such a danger arise, it would instruct its representatives on the 
Council of the League of Nations to recommend that the restoration of the 
territorial frontiers of Albania should be entrusted to Italy. This, it has to be 
said, represented a major diplomatic triumph for Rome – for Italy’s protec-
torate over Albania had thus been explicitly acknowledged – and Mussolini 
later used this to good eﬀect.
Toptani was in June  assassinated in Paris by a fellow Albanian, 
something which could not have displeased Zogu. But the Yugoslavs then 
invaded northern Albania in August, reaching as far as Mati, Zogu’s home 
turf. An important result of this, it seems, was Zogu’s secret understand-
ing with Belgrade not to meddle in Kosovo, something which the Kosovo 
Albanians described as an act of treason. Belgrade really meant business 
in Albania. In July  it helped organize the secession from Albania of 
the northern province of Mirdita (inhabited largely by Catholics), and its 
“Republic of Mirdita” clients were by October  within thirty miles of 
Tirana, causing Lloyd George to get considerably upset by the Yugoslavs 
who were forced to withdraw. Already in  Zogu had established rela-
tions with the Serbs at Niš. After the assassination of Essad Pasha Toptani, 
 E. Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to  (New York: Dorset 
Press, ), .
 By far the best, though not ﬂawless, account of Zogu is the recent biography by Ja-
son Tomes, King Zog: Self-made Monarch of Albania (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing 
Limited, ).
 See Tomes, King Zog, .
 Tomes, King Zog, -.
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Belgrade was looking at Zogu as its next ally and helped him to establish 
himself in power towards the end of . It did not know then that Zogu 
was the master in a policy of double-cross.
Britain’s inﬂuence on Zogu was considerable at this time, especially 
through its minister Harry Eyres (Britain’s representative in Albania since 
January ) who was recommending Zogu to develop closer relations 
with Italy to oﬀset the pressure from the Serbs. But not even Eyres 
could help his friend Zogu to stave oﬀ a major rebellion against him in 
 which forced him, in June, to seek refuge in Yugoslavia, the helms 
of power being now taken by Fan Noli, a controversial Orthodox bishop, 
Harvard-educated and known for his pro-Italian, anti-League of Nations 
and anti-British views, but more important, someone who was talked about 
as a politician not averse to seeking the help of the Soviet Union, which 
particularly irritated the intensely anti-Bolshevik Belgrade. In Belgrade, 
Zogu waited for his next opportunity to return to power. By late Decem-
ber , thanks to Yugoslav arms and money (and to General Wrangel’s 
White Russian forces based in Yugoslavia), Zogu managed to overthrow 
Fan Noli and thus acquired the reputation of Serbia’s man. In January 
 he became Albania’s dictator-president. However, as C.L. Sulzberger 
wrote about Zogu: “Ambition is an infectious disease.” For Zogu lost no 
time in turning against his erstwhile allies, although, in fairness to him, he 
gave Belgrade the villages of St. Naum and Vermash in a display of not 
particularly exaggerated gratitude for being able to carry out his coup de 
main in Tirana. He had relied at this time on advice of Colonel Stirling, a 
British ex-oﬃcer, who saw Yugoslavia as Albania’s obvious ally, a country 
that could help him consolidate power. But Belgrade failed to produce the 
necessary money (and Greece, in internal turmoil, was even less capable to 
 Živko Avramovski, “Akcija jugoslovenske vlade protiv Zoguovog režima u Albaniji 
preko Cena bega Kryziu (–.)”, Albanološka istraživanja (Prishtina: Filozofski 
fakultet, ), .
 Tomes, King Zog, . Competent studies dealing with Yugoslavia’s interwar interna-
tional relations include Desanka Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države – 
(Belgrade: Narodna knjiga and Institut za savremenu istoriju, ); Dunja Hercigo-
nja, Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije – (Belgrade: Institut za 
savremenu istoriju, ); and Enes Milak, Italija i Jugoslavija – (Belgrade: 
Institut za savremenu istoriju, ).
 Tomes, King Zog, -. In Belgrade, Zog took up residence in Hotel Bristol where 
he quickly gained the reputation as “a lion with the ladies”. Tomes, King Zog, .
 Ibid., –.
 C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries – (London: 
Macdonald, ), .
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help at this stage), so there is a sense in which Zogu really had no choice.
“The loyalty of an Albanian Bey,” it has been so rightly observed, “was worth 
no more than the money with which it was bought, and lasted as long as 
the money.”
Given the permanent internal instability in Albania, Mussolini’s 
“new Roman Empire” could most easily begin to take shape in that country. 
But it was only in , after viewing with suspicion Germany’s economic 
attempts to establish a foothold in Albania, that Italy took the decision to 
build a serious economic and political position in Albania, receiving conces-
sions regarding the woodlands and seeking to obtain permission for oil ex-
ploration. The st Tirana Pact (November ) between Italy and Albania 
entailed an even greater economic penetration. And much more than that: 
Article I declared: “Italy and Albania recognise that any disturbance threat-
ening the political, legal and territorial status quo of Albania is contrary to 
their common interest.” Thus a new Italian protectorate over Albania had 
been de facto established (following the practically formal decision of the 
 Conference of Ambassadors to give Italy a free hand in Albania), caus-
ing the resignation in Belgrade of foreign minister Momčilo Ninčić who 
correctly saw the Pact of Tirana as an essentially hostile measure against 
Yugoslavia, in ﬂagrant contradiction to the Pact of Rome. “Italy could 
now threaten [Yugoslavia] from her two frontiers, north and south, and 
also from across the Adriatic.” In truth, however, Ninčić and Belgrade had 
also violated the Pact of Rome when they helped Zogu, in , to return to 
power, timing this decision brilliantly as Mussolini had the Matteoti aﬀair 
on his hands. But Zogu now dumped his former Yugoslav protectors and 
sought, perhaps not unwisely, but certainly treacherously, Italy’s support to 
develop his backward country economically. Already in January  he ad-
dressed Mussolini with an oﬀer of strengthening relations between Albania 
and Italy. And by September of that year Italian banks had provided capital 
for the „National Bank of Albania“.
 M. W. Fodor, South of Hitler (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, ), .
 Gaetano Salvemini, Prelude to World War II (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, ), 
.
 Quoted in Muriel Currey, Italian Foreign Policy – (London: Ivor Nicholson 
and Watson Ltd, ), . For useful details on the Italian side, see Gabriele Paresce, 
Italia e Jugoslavia dal  al  (Florence: R. Bemporad & Figlio, ). For a still 
useful contemporary French account, see Jacques Ancel, Les Balkans face à l ’Italie (Paris: 
Librairie Delagrave, ), .
 See Milak, Italija i Jugoslavija, -. 
 Doros Alastos, The Balkans and Europe (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, ), 
-.
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Things with Zogu, however, were never as simple as that. Whilst seeking 
economic aid from Italy, he also played a parallel game with Britain. Harry 
Eyres was succeeded early in  by Edmund O’Reilly. Also at this time a 
new Italian representative arrived in Albania. This was the notorious wom-
anizer Barone Pompeo Aloisi, Mussolini’s darling diplomat, but also the 
darling of the wives in the Tirana diplomatic corps – he had no problem in 
charming them. In any case, the other main preoccupation of Aloisi was to 
convince Zogu to accept an Italo-Albanian treaty, a task in which he suc-
ceeded in the end when the Pact of Tirana was signed. But Zogu had before 
then attempted to interest O’Reilly in an Anglo-Albanian commercial trea-
ty. Lord Vansittart recalls perceptively in his memoirs: “O’Reilly said dryly 
that the Pact was incompatible with Albanian independence. The Duce was 
in turn furious and protested to Austen, who removed O’Reilly and got us 
a bad name.” When O’Reilly advised Zogu not to yield to Mussolini’s 
pressure, the reaction in London was cool. Sir Austen Chamberlain, the 
new foreign secretary, saw no direct British interest in Albania except that 
he wanted to avoid Italo-French-Yugoslav complications and extricate Brit-
ain from any such possibilities. O’Reilly was soon succeeded by William 
Seeds. What was certainly not the case, as will be seen, was that “Cham-
berlain had decided that stability in the Adriatic was best served by treating 
Albania as an Italian sphere of inﬂuence.” That is far too simplistic a way 
of describing Chamberlain’s policy. And what Chamberlain could not have 
known at the time (August ) was that Mussolini had concluded with 
Zogu a secret military treaty which provided for cooperation in war with 
Yugoslavia, complete with a promise of Kosovo to Albania. In fact, both 
the Italian foreign ministry and Mussolini himself began to have second 
thoughts about this arrangement: why should Italy risk being dragged by 
Zogu into a war for Kosovo?
The position of Great Britain in the ongoing Italo-Yugoslav aﬀair 
over Albania must be viewed primarily in political rather than economic 
terms. True, oil exploration was not a negligible factor. Already in  Al-
bania signed a preliminary agreement with D’Arcy Exploration, a subsidiary 
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in which Britain owned a controlling 
stake. However, this paled into insigniﬁcance in comparison with Britain’s 
political considerations. The British government was from November  
again headed by Stanley Baldwin, perhaps the dominant British politician 
 Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London: Hutchinson, ), . Vansittart was 
Stanley Baldwin’s Principal Private Secretary.
 Tomes, King Zog, -.
 Ibid., .
 Ibid., . 
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in the interwar period, three times prime minister (–, –, 
–) and Lord President of the Council from  to . Subse-
quently blamed for the failure of Britain to rearm in the face of the growing 
menace of Germany under Hitler, he was famous for not being interested in 
foreign aﬀairs in the slightest. His knowledge of Europe “hardly extended 
beyond Aix-les-Bains, the French spa to which he and his wife were in the 
habit of resorting each year to take the waters.” Just as well that his foreign 
secretary (–) was the Cambridge-educated Sir Austen Chamber-
lain, a man with considerable previous government experience and a deep 
knowledge of European aﬀairs.
Chamberlain’s chief diplomatic achievement is generally regarded to 
be the conclusion, in , of the Treaties of Locarno, which brought Ger-
many back to the mainstream of European aﬀairs and generally seemed to 
herald a new, prolonged era of peace. Of course, France’s Aristide Briand 
and Germany’s Gustav Stresemann were no less responsible for Locarno, 
but Chamberlain had demonstrated genuine interest in international coop-
eration. Signed by France, Germany and Belgium, Locarno was guaranteed 
by Britain and – signiﬁcantly – Mussolini’s Italy, until then hardly treated 
as a ﬁrst class power. But what did Locarno really mean? While it settled 
the Franco-German diﬀerences in the West, it left the frontiers of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Austria completely unguaranteed against Germany 
– “and herein lay the seeds of the Second World War”. Britain and Italy, as 
the guarantor powers, in eﬀect guaranteed nothing, they only had “a moral 
obligation, a mere form of words”. They could not undertake to prepare for 
the fulﬁlment of their guarantees since the aggressor would not be known 
until he actually appeared. And this was perfect for Britain – play the be-
nevolent peacemaker, but make sure your own vital interests are not threat-
ened. It was realpolitik of the ﬁrst order. No wonder that Hughe Knatch-
 E. Royston Pike, Britain’s Prime Ministers (Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing for Odham 
Books, ), . According to Lord Home, Baldwin was “ill at ease with foreigners,” 
going so far as to contrive that he “need not sit next to them at meals”. In May , 
Baldwin told Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary: “We must get nearer to Germany,” 
and when Eden asked him “How?” Baldwin replied: “I have no idea, that is your job.” 
Quoted in Frank Longford, Eleven at No.  (London: Harrap, ) . 
 Austen Chamberlain was the son of Joseph Chamberlain, the famous British impe-
rialist who became the Colonial Secretary in the Unionist government of . Neville 
Chamberlain, the unfortunate British prime minister who succumbed to Hitler at Mu-
nich in , was Austen’s half-brother. For a good biography of Austen Chamberlain, 
see David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (Bolton: Ross Anderson 
Publications, ).
 Richard Lamb, The Drift to War – (London, ), .
 See Taylor, The Origins, -.
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bull-Hugessen, a Foreign Oﬃce diplomat, commented on Locarno that, 
whereas Chamberlain was jubilant, the “French were more matter-of-fact 
and more sceptical”. Italy, too, was in fact somewhat sceptical as Mussolini 
wished the Franco-German problem to stay on the Rhine, fearing that Ger-
many would next turn to Austria and the question of Alto Adige.
Even more important for an understanding of British postwar policy 
(and this would later be demonstrated by Chamberlain in his ﬁnal handling 
of the Italo-Yugoslav crisis over Albania in ) is its rejection, before 
Locarno, of the Geneva Protocol which attempted to make more eﬃcient 
the instruments of the League of Nations in preserving peace and deterring 
aggression or, broadly speaking, to make every member of the League guar-
antee the frontiers of Europe (in other words to commit itself to waging 
war), and this was meant to be done by means of compulsory arbitration of 
all disputes. Although the initiative for the Geneva Protocol lay with the 
Labour prime minister Ramsay MacDonald, the true guardians of British 
foreign policy were the Conservatives who returned to power in November 
. The British Dominions were dead against the Geneva Protocol, but 
this only served the new foreign secretary Chamberlain as an excuse to reject 
it. Although he paid lip-service to Britain as a country “only twenty miles 
oﬀ the Continent of Europe” which should not engage in “short-sighted 
isolation”, he was fully aware of the dangers of undesired foreign entangle-
ments in which Britain had no interest whatsoever. He knew perfectly well 
that Britain was much more an imperial than a continental power: why 
accept something that would only increase the burden of its obligations?
Knatchbull-Hugessen again: “The Geneva Protocol was still-born: it was 
quite impossible for us to accept its liabilities. If German and Italian policy 
developed on the lines feared and if the League remained unarmed and 
powerless, France would be driven to something more practical. She already 
had her friends in the Little Entente, a system of alliances reminiscent of 
pre-war methods. Italy for her part showed signs of collecting all the mal-
contents under her wing.”
 Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 
), .
 Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe – (Lon-
don: The Macmillan Press Ltd, ), .
 Quoted in G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Relations –
, th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, ), .
 For this, see also A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British 
Power, nd ed. (London: Macmillan, ), -.
 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, .
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Indeed, this was the key to Chamberlain’s subsequent Balkan policy. As 
F. S. Northedge has written, through the Geneva Protocol Britain “might 
be involved in conﬂicts which neither British opinion nor opinion in the 
Empire could regard as having as their issue the life or death of Britain”. 
The Protocol, Northedge remarks, “was contrary to the approach to foreign 
policy to which Britain, by every inclination and interest, was committed 
and which she had followed at least since the French Revolution.” And 
he quotes Chamberlain himself: “Only in the case where her interests are 
immediately at stake and where her own safety must be directly of any 
change has Great Britain ever consented to bind herself beforehand to spe-
ciﬁc engagements on the continent of Europe.” The Protocol, according to 
Chamberlain, multiplied oﬀences but did nothing to strengthen remedies.
In March  Chamberlain formally informed the Council of the League 
of Nations that Britain would not accept the Protocol.
Italy and Yugoslavia had in the meantime worked hard on improving 
their relations. On  July , after extensive previous negotiations, they 
signed at Nettuno (near Rome) a series of agreements dealing with mat-
ters ﬁnancial, legal and political. However, the Croats (and especially the 
Dalmatians) considered that Belgrade had given away too much, and in the 
face of their opposition the agreements were not ratiﬁed in Yugoslavia.
This put an end to any hopes Chamberlain may have entertained of creating 
a “Balkan Locarno”. There is no question that he had developed a certain 
fondness for the Italian dictator. But he was far from starry-eyed about him. 
He wrote in December : “I am disposed to say that Mussolini needs 
ten years of peace before he undertakes any adventure [a remarkably correct 
prediction]. In ﬁve years I shall begin to watch him closely – which is not to 
say that I keep my eyes shut now.” In fact, as things turned out, he had to 
begin to watch him very carefully only a few months later.
 F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers – 
(London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, ), -.
 See Currey, Italian Foreign Policy, .
 See Vuk Vinaver, “Engleska i italijansko ‘zaokruživanje Jugoslavije’ –” in Is-
torija XX veka, Zbornik radova VII (Belgrade, ), –. Vinaver’s article, however, 
should be treated with a degree of scepticism as he cannot resist, without fully explain-
ing, to lambaste what he sees as an essentially pro-Italian British policy. His use of Yu-
goslav, Italian, French, German and Russian sources considerably outweighs his British 
material which is in any case constituted by secondary sources (mainly newspapers) 
and worse still, he relies too heavily on Yugoslav diplomatic accounts from the legation 
in London. Primary British material is conspicuous by its absence in this article. For a 
more balanced account, see Živko Avramovski, Balkanska antanta (–), (Bel-
grade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, ), -. 
 Quoted in Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, , n. .
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The Foreign Oﬃce was alerted about the fast deteriorating Italo-Yugoslav 
relations over Albania towards the end of February . Howard Ken-
nard, the British Minister at Belgrade sent to London a despatch in which 
he drew attention to the fact that the Italian Legation were spreading the 
most alarmist reports for which, according to Kennard, there appeared to 
be “but slight justiﬁcation”. Kennard noted that even General Visconti, the 
Italian military attaché, took a far moderate view than his colleagues. But it 
is clear that Kennard himself was far from sure about what was really go-
ing on. He allowed for the possibility that the Yugoslav military were about 
to spring a “coup d’état” in Albania since “in the Balkans one never knows 
what folly the soldiers may be up to”. His despatch to London, however, re-
ally amounted only to guesswork. Thus he speculated that General Bodrero, 
the head of the Italian Legation, who was quite keen to stay on in Belgrade, 
was deliberately sending exaggerated reports to Rome in order to contradict 
the view “which may be held in Rome” that he was too conciliatory towards 
the Yugoslavs. He also added that one could not judge Italian diplomacy by 
ordinary standards as the Italians often wished to “fare ﬁgura” (to make an 
impression) without there existing any Machiavellian plots. In truth, Ken-
nard just had no idea, but he was in a pessimistic mood. While he noted that 
“poor little [Ninko] Perić”, the new Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, 
seemed to be showing good sense, he also considered the Yugoslav press and 
public opinion to be so Italophobe that it was useless to try to control this 
tendency. And he feared that Rome-Belgrade relations were drifting to the 
channels existing between Vienna and Belgrade before the war.
Only a few days later, on  March, Chamberlain was personally told 
about the state of Italo-Yugoslav relations by Marchese della Torretta, the 
Italian Ambassador to London. The wider context of this meeting related 
to President Calvin Coolidge’s invitation to a conference which would ne-
gotiate a further treaty on naval disarmament, following the Washington 
Treaty of . Mussolini’s position was that Italy should not participate 
unless the basis for discussions should be accepted whereby France and Italy 
would enjoy parity in regard of smaller naval craft. Chamberlain had no 
intention of supporting Mussolini on this, knowing that the French would 
never agree to the principle of parity, and he diplomatically discouraged 
Torretta. The latter, incredibly, argued that Yugoslavia, for example, had no 
navy for the time being, “but was showing indications of an intention to 
create a naval force to which Italy could not be indiﬀerent”. Chamberlain 
 Kennard to Sargent,  February , in W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. 
E. Lambert, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, –, ser. Ia, vol. III, “Eu-
ropean and Naval Questions, ” (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Oﬃce, ; 
hereafter referred to as DBFP), No. .
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used this opportunity to enquire whether there had been any improvement 
in Italy’s relations with Belgrade since the appointment of Milan Rakić, the 
new Yugoslav Minister to Rome. Predictably, Torretta gave a negative reply, 
blaming “the military inﬂuences” which he claimed dominated the Yugoslav 
government, and which were “hostile to any accommodation and consti-
tuted a serious danger to peace”. But Chamberlain was not going to swal-
low this without dissenting comment which, characteristically, he couched 
in assuaging language. He stated that he had never doubted Italy’s peace-
ful intentions towards Albania, and yet at the same time it was “clear” to 
him that the suspicions and apprehensions entertained in Yugoslavia about 
Italian policy “were not a mere excuse”. However ill-founded this was, he 
pointed out, it had taken possession of a large part of Yugoslav opinion, and 
this was something “which statesmen had to take into account”. At the end, 
Chamberlain warned Torretta that it was dangerous to allow the Yugoslav 
suspicions regarding Italian aims to grow “until they became convictions 
which nothing could shake”, something which placed other aﬀected nations 
in a considerable dilemma.
Despite such admonitions to Italy by Britain, in the following days 
the tensions between Yugoslavia and Italy continued to increase. On  
March Kennard telegraphed to Chamberlain that there were incidents oﬀ 
the Yugoslav coast regarding Italian ﬁshing vessels, prompting the Italian 
Legation in Belgrade to practically issue an ultimatum threatening that 
ﬁshing vessels would be escorted by warships. Kennard also reported that 
he was “favourably” impressed by Rakić, who was about to take up his post 
in Rome, and who assured him the Italian rumours about Yugoslav military 
activity were without foundation. Indeed, Colonel Giles, the British mili-
tary attaché to Belgrade, conﬁrmed at this time his previous view that the 
rumours of Yugoslav oﬀensive military action were “groundless”. Never-
theless, the Italians kept up the pressure relentlessly. On  March Torretta 
called on Chamberlain again, handing him a memorandum (presented also 
to the governments of France and Germany) which cited a number of mea-
sures ostensibly being taken by Yugoslav military authorities with the aim of 
preparing for early hostilities against Italy, with the bulk of forces concen-
trated on Albanian and Slovene frontiers. Torretta told Chamberlain that 
power in Yugoslavia had by now “passed wholly into the hands of the army 
and the King”, and that Signor Mussolini wished to draw the attention of 
His Majesty’s Government to the serious situation that was arising. This, 
 Chamberlain to Sir Ronald Graham (Rome),  March , DBFP, No. .
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid., n. .
 Chamberlain to Graham,  March , DBFP, No. .
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however, was a view entirely dismissed by the British Legation in Belgrade. 
Kennard had been informed about Chamberlain’s meeting with the Ital-
ian ambassador, and in the early hours of  March, he sent his comments 
to London, which, point by point, entirely dismantled Torrettta’s memo-
randum on Yugoslav military preparations. And it was, Kennard thought, 
“hardly justiﬁable to say that power in Yugoslavia is chieﬂy in the hands of 
the army and the King. Present government is weak and the King no doubt 
exercises more inﬂuence under these circumstances.” Kennard also empha-
sized that it would be natural for the Yugoslavs to endeavour to bring up 
their army to some standard of eﬃciency following the conclusion of the 
pact of Tirana, but that this army was “lamentably deﬁcient” in everything 
except manpower to undertake military operations on a large scale.
Only a few days earlier Kennard had already recommended to Lon-
don that the remedy for the Yugoslav-Italian mutual suspicion was to send 
experienced neutral observers who would inspect the frontier on both the 
Yugoslav and Albanian sides and produce an unbiased report. The Yugoslav 
government thought along the same lines, and Chamberlain now welcomed 
the suggestion which J. T. Marković, the Yugoslav assistant Minister for 
Foreign Aﬀairs, had made to Kennard, that various military attachés should 
be invited to proceed to the Albanian frontier with the task of rendering an 
objective report. Chamberlain therefore instructed Kennard to act on this 
matter in Belgrade. He had already been very disturbed by reports that it 
was actually the Albanian government, not Yugoslav, that was concentrating 
troops on the frontier (the ﬁgure in circulation was , Albanian troops 
on the frontier towards Prizren) and had asked Seeds to investigate this 
matter. Seeds did so, informing Chamberlain that both the Italian claims 
about Yugoslav military preparations, and the rumours of Albanian troop 
concentrations were being exaggerated. But he also recommended that 
unless steps were taken soon to secure a “Serbian-Italian accommodation 
to put a mistrust arising out of Tirana treaty present situation is infallibly 
bound to result in an explosion”. Chamberlain subsequently ordered Seeds 
to keep quiet in Albania pending further instructions. “The situation,” he 
wrote to Seeds, “is engaging my serious attention.”
Thus, since the very beginning of the Italo-Yugoslav crisis over Al-
bania, the Foreign Oﬃce and all its representatives in the region genuinely 
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid., n. .
 Chamberlain to Kennard,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Seeds to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid., n. .
J. Zametica, Chamberlain and the Italo-Yugoslav Crisis 217
believed that the whole aﬀair amounted to a storm in a teacup, a totally 
manufactured crisis. It was especially sceptical about the Italian claims. But 
at the same time it was more than sensitive to the possible repercussions of 
a crisis which could easily slip out of control. And this was the essence of 
Britain’s policy: to try to defuse a crisis which it had absolutely no interest 
in being sucked into. But now it was the turn of the Yugoslav government 
to be unhelpful. For Perić, faced with sharp parliamentary criticism over 
the proposal that a commission of military attachés should conduct an en-
quiry, explained to Kennard that it would be preferable to have this exercise 
conducted by the League of Nations. The British reaction was bordering on 
helpless impatience as Kennard suggested to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister 
that whatever the decision, it should be taken “at once”. The news of direct 
Italian-Yugoslav talks was also discouraging. Rakić had seen Mussolini in 
Rome on  March and Graham reported to London that no headway had 
been made. This was a particular disappointment to Chamberlain who 
had hoped, perhaps naively, that the arrival of Rakić in Rome would lead 
to the resumption of friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia on the 
basis of the reaﬃrmation of the  Pact of Rome. He therefore instruct-
ed Graham to seek an immediate interview with Mussolini, informing the 
Ambassador at the same time that sections of public opinion in Britain were 
already demanding that the British government should invoke Article  of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Mussolini, however, was not at all keen that the crisis should be han-
dled by the League of Nations, something which Gustav Stresemann in 
Germany was already hinting should be done. The Quai d’Orsay was in-
formed that Mussolini considered such an action as “entirely inadmissible”. 
The French position in this crisis, in fact, was inﬁnitely more conciliatory 
towards Italy than Britain’s. It can even be argued that there can be no 
comparison. Philippe Berthelot, the French General Secretary of Foreign 
Aﬀairs, told the Marquess of Crewe, the British ambassador to Paris, that 
France had been counselling the Yugoslavs “extreme moderation”. Indeed. 
Even the Marquess of Crewe was so shocked by the French that he felt it 
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 DBFP, No. , n. .
 Chamberlain to Graham,  March , DBFP, No. . Article  of the Covenant 
stated: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately aﬀecting any Members of the 
League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the 
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and eﬀectual to safeguard the 
peace of nations.” For the full text, see Arthur Berriedale Keith, ed., Speeches and Docu-
ments on International Aﬀairs – (London: Oxford University Press, ), vol. 
I, -.
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necessary, in his telegram to Chamberlain informing him of his conver-
sation with Berthelot, to italicize what the latter had told him about the 
French eﬀort to convince the Yugoslavs to show the utmost restraint “even 
in the event of an armed Italian landing in Albania”. The French had even got 
the Czechoslovak foreign minister Edvard Beneš to urge moderation in 
Belgrade. Moreover, as Berthelot told Crewe, France had already informed 
Italy that it was not going to conclude the friendly treaty of understanding 
with Yugoslavia (March ) which had been initialled, but not signed, 
because it did not wish to raise Italy’s suspicions that such a treaty was di-
rected against it, being desirous that beforehand Italy and Yugoslavia should 
sign their own treaty. Paris thought it advisable, and pressurized Miroslav 
Spalajković, the Yugoslav Minister in Paris, that Yugoslavia should ratify 
the  Nettuno agreements with Italy. It was thus not a little contradic-
tory of Berthelot to, admittedly correctly, identify the Treaty of Tirana as 
something “unfortunate”, in that Italy could intervene in Albania in the 
event of the political status quo being changed, “which in eﬀect means”, 
as he told Crewe, “in the event of the forcible overthrow of the Albanians 
themselves of Ahmed Zogu”. In other words, the French were blowing 
hot and cold.
Chamberlain was at this stage almost completely preoccupied by the 
Italo-Yugoslav aﬀair. What he could still not understand was the reason-
ing behind Mussolini’s memorandum which Torretta had given him on  
March, a document listing the Italian view of Yugoslav military prepara-
tions. Given that the Italian paper had also been sent to Paris and Ber-
lin, Chamberlain naturally felt that he had been placed in an embarrass-
ing position. He openly told Torretta on  March that he was “consider-
ably perplexed” and “puzzled” by this formal communication of the Italian 
government. What exactly, he asked the Italian ambassador, had been in 
Mussolini’s mind? Sincerely or not, Torretta replied that he himself had no 
answer to this question. The British Foreign Secretary was subtle enough to 
point out to Torretta that the Italian government had not appealed to the 
League of Nations, something which suggested that it did not want this 
course to be adopted. At the same time, he praised Perić for using moderate 
language which appeared to him “entirely commendable”.
At long last Mussolini provided some answers. Graham saw him in 
the evening of  March. Il Duce explained that his memorandum to the 
 Crewe to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 A commendable account of France’s international policy during this period is by J. 
Néré, The Foreign Policy of France from  to  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
). The original French version was published in .
 Chamberlain to Graham,  March , DBFP, No. .
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governments in London, Paris and Berlin served the purpose of avoiding 
“an immediate explosion”. Without oﬀering any hard evidence, he told Gra-
ham that the Italian government had known of Yugoslav aggressive prepa-
rations and organization of bands on north Albanian frontier for incursion 
during the spring. This, he claimed, was the work of the Yugoslav “military 
party”. But his communication to the three Powers had had the desired ef-
fect, and the danger, he said, was already diminishing as shown by press in 
both Rome in Belgrade. He further argued that, in this new context, there 
was no need to go the League of Nations, something that would merely 
entail undesired public debate and press polemics. Mussolini then revealed 
what he was essentially after. The best solution, he suggested to Graham, 
would be if the Yugoslavs made some friendly gesture, such as ratiﬁcation 
of Nettuno conventions. The British, however, were frankly sceptical, and 
indeed very realistic, about Mussolini’s proposal. On  March Graham 
reported to Chamberlain that he had alluded to Mussolini about “the feel-
ing of nervousness in Belgrade”, pointing out to him that the Yugoslavs had 
had enough of a problem in the past presenting the Nettuno conventions 
to their parliament, a problem that was even greater now in the light of the 
current tension between the two countries. Graham bluntly told Mussolini 
that the government in Belgrade “could not be expected to give the appear-
ance of yielding to Italian pressure”.
However, the Yugoslav government now began to soften up. Perić, 
who had previously expressed misgivings about a commission of enquiry 
made up of foreign military attachés to inspect the Yugoslav-Albanian 
frontier, succumbing previously to parliamentary pressure to favour the role 
of the League of Nations instead, surprised the British and Italian ministers 
at Belgrade by telling them that military experts could proceed with this 
task, thus catching the Italian minister in a state of “confusion”. But this 
was hardly Perić’s own initiative. In Paris the Marquess of Crewe found out 
from Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister, that it was France which 
had discouraged the Yugoslavs from pursuing their complaint against Italy 
at the League of Nations. Briand told Crewe that aﬀairs had not reached 
the point at which such an action could properly be taken. Nevertheless, 
Briand reiterated what London had already known about the French view 
of the Treaty of Tirana. This treaty Briand assessed as a “danger point”, given 
that it could enable Italy to act not only in the event of an attack on Albania 
from outside, but also in the event of the existing regime being threatened 
internally. He took the view that the terms of the Treaty should in some way 
 Graham to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid., n. .
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
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be altered to arrive at its interpretation which would neutralize this danger. 
“Unless this is done,” he told Crewe, “there must be perpetual unrest in 
that quarter of Europe.” What Briand did not tell Crewe was that within 
the French government there were serious misgivings about Britain’s policy 
towards the Italo-Yugoslav conﬂict. Sir Charles Mendl, the British press at-
taché in Paris, informed London, “in strict conﬁdence”, that Louis Barthou 
and André Tardieu, respectively Minister of Justice and Minister of Public 
Works, believed that British foreign policy was, “often without reason”, run-
ning contrary to that of France. As the main example, Mendl reported the 
view held by Barthou and Tardieu that Britain had allowed without protest 
the signature of the Treaty of Tirana, which they believed had demonstrated 
London’s favour towards Italy to lay hands on Albania. But this was some-
what rich of the French who conveniently forgot that the November  
Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, which of course included France, had al-
ready practically given Italy a free hand in Albania, and that it was precisely 
this move which had given rise to subsequent tensions between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. For good measure, Mendl also reported about the French un-
happiness over London’s “uneasiness” over the Franco-German rapproche-
ment, something which, according to the French, Britain now wished to 
oﬀset by a new entente with Italy.
Upon reading this despatch, Chamberlain was furious to say the least. 
He protested that Mendl’s note about the French view that Britain was 
seeking a new entente with Italy because of the Franco-German rapproche-
ment was “so silly that it is really diﬃcult to deal with it”, and that Britain 
had in fact worked hard for that rapprochement. Writing about Britain’s 
relations with Italy, he added bitterly: “They are not an oﬀ-set to a friend-
ship with France, nor a counterpoise to the Franco-German rapprochement.
They are a necessary consequence of the Treaty of Locarno, and but for them 
France would be in danger of seeing Italy fall once more under purely Ger-
man inﬂuences.” On the Italian-Yugoslav diﬃculties, he explained that his 
policy had been to exert inﬂuence steadily but quietly to press moderation 
on Italy. And he did not view the Treaty of Tirana in such alarmist terms as 
they were read in France. He emphasized that he never lost an opportunity 
to remind Mussolini of what the latter had told him already during their 
ﬁrst meeting in December , that Italy had no aggressive designs on 
Albania. “My inﬂuence,” he explained, “was used towards securing friendly 
 Crewe to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Mendl to Gregory,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid. For the November  Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, see E. H. Carr, 
International Relations Between the Two World Wars – (London: Macmillan, 
), -.
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explanations of the terms of the Treaty.” Chamberlain was left wondering, in 
the end, whether the French actually realized what the true interests of their 
policy were. It has to be said that, far from wishing to establish any new 
friendly relationship with Italy, as the somewhat paranoid French seemed to 
be implying, the British foreign secretary was displaying remarkable ﬁrm-
ness in not giving an inch away to Mussolini, and in particular so over Yugo-
slavia. He regarded Mussolini’s suggestion that the Yugoslavs should at once 
prepare for ratifying Nettuno Conventions as “impossible”. The proposed 
ratiﬁcation, he wrote to Crewe in Paris, was unobtainable by itself, but might 
be secured by Italian friendly explanations to the Serbs that the Treaty of 
Tirana was not merely a veiled protectorate over Albania designed to main-
tain Ahmed Zogu both against external and internal threats to his rule.
Thus, the most that can be said about Chamberlain’s attitude towards 
Mussolini is that he was prepared to give him the beneﬁt of the doubt, 
whilst at the same time he not only clearly understood Yugoslav fears and 
apprehensions, he actually actively defended them. And not just Chamber-
lain, but the British ministers on the ground held practically identical posi-
tions on this question. From Durazzo Seeds reported to Chamberlain that 
even the Albanian government was not so much preoccupied with any Ser-
bian military preparations. He suggested that the scare about those prepara-
tions in fact emanated from Italian sources in Yugoslavia and from Rome 
itself, anxious as it was to demonstrate to world in general and to Albanian 
public opinion the beneﬁts of an Italian protectorate over Albania. Seeds 
agreed with Kennard in Belgrade who had “rightly minimized” the alleged 
Serbian military activities. And he added that Zogu himself had told him 
the Serbian main attack would not develop before August. Kennard was 
also in total agreement with Chamberlain. He thought it “impossible” at 
this juncture to secure ratiﬁcation of Nettuno Conventions unless Yugo-
slavia received adequate compensations. He considered that the Yugoslav 
government was “too weak”, adding that public opinion in the country was 
angry about Mussolini’s attack not only against the government, but also 
against the King personally. And Kennard also took the view that, in the cir-
cumstances, “friendly gesture should come from Rome in the ﬁrst instance 
rather than from Belgrade”. His personal view was that the existing and 
clearly troublesome Pact of Tirana should be scrapped, to be replaced by 
a new one. Similarly, Graham in Rome, in frequent contact with Rakić, 
 Memorandum by Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Chamberlain to Crewe,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Seeds to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Ibid.
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described the situation to Chamberlain as “a vicious circle”: Mussolini was 
prepared to oﬀer satisfactory explanations of the Tirana pact, but only if 
Belgrade ratiﬁed Nettuno Conventions. “No doubt with truth,” Graham 
observed, the Yugoslavs were saying that immediate ratiﬁcation was impos-
sible. But Graham also warned Chamberlain that Kennard’s private idea 
of doing away with the pact of Tirana was a non-starter since Mussolini was 
in the habit of using his foreign policy to enhance his prestige for purposes 
of internal aﬀairs: “He will not contemplate anything in the nature of a 
climb-down.”
Towards the end of March, however, Chamberlain’s attitude towards 
Yugoslavia began to shift, certainly not dramatically, but a shift was never-
theless clearly evident. In a letter marked “Private”, he confessed to Kennard 
that he was more concerned about what was happening in Yugoslavia than 
in Italy. “I am convinced,” he wrote, “that Mussolini contemplates no ag-
gression on Albania, but I would not be answerable for the consequences 
if another revolution broke out there and above all if it started from Yugo-
Slavian territory.” In part, there was a sense in which Chamberlain was 
merely stating the obvious: no reports, no intelligence reaching the Foreign 
Oﬃce had suggested that Italy was about to go into Albania with military 
force. There was simply no reason for such an action given the pro-Italian 
policy of Ahmed Zogu. For the time being, it did not even suit Mussolini 
to resort to arms given that he had been declaring to the world his peace-
ful intentions. Of course, what the Treaty of Tirana had given Mussolini 
was the option to use force if and when he deemed such action necessary. 
Realistically, this could only take place in the event of an interventionist 
course adopted in Belgrade towards Albania. But all the information that 
Chamberlain had been receiving was precisely that Belgrade was not con-
templating an intervention. What, then, was his latest thinking? The only 
explanation, such as it was, that he oﬀered to Kennard was that he had 
certain reservations about the intentions of King Alexander I, and this only 
from his “memory” about a conversation the King had with Kennard back 
in December , when the King, according to Chamberlain, had used 
“very ominous language”. The question thus arises: had the British foreign 
secretary fallen for the recent Italian propaganda identifying the King as 
falling prey to the so-called Yugoslav “military party”? The answer must be 
a cautious no. As Chamberlain elaborated to Kennard: the weakness of the 
government in Belgrade “make them diﬃcult people to help, but I do not 
wish you to think that I have thrown myself unconditionally into the Italian 
camp and am pursuing an Italian policy to the detriment of Yugo-Slavia. 
 Graham to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Graham to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
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On the contrary, I have steadily sought to bring Mussolini to a conciliatory 
and reasonable frame of mind.” And he also made the following important 
point to Kennard: “My capacity for usefulness depends upon my retaining 
Mussolini’s conﬁdence and friendship.”
During the month of March there had been much talk in the triangle 
London-Paris-Berlin about sending to the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier a 
commission of enquiry made up of British, French and German oﬃcers 
(joined by an Italian and Serbian oﬃcer). This was essentially Chamberlain’s 
idea. Mussolini was against, Belgrade would rather have nothing to do with 
it, but the French government accepted the proposal, and the Germans had 
nothing against it, either. Nevertheless, Paris was rightly sceptical about 
what this could achieve at all. Thus the diplomatic initiative passed on to 
the French who suggested to Chamberlain that the proposed commission 
“would not be solution of real cause of Italian-Serbian diﬀerences i.e. provi-
sions of treaty of Tirana”. And so, while the government of France had no 
objection that the commission should proceed with its work, this would 
“not in any way prevent direct conversations between Italy and Serbia with 
a view to reaching a permanent agreement”. The government in Paris at the 
same time acknowledged that Britain was best qualiﬁed to speak to Rome 
on this subject, while for its part it promised to use its inﬂuence in Belgrade 
“in order to bring about ﬁrstly the ratiﬁcation of Nettuno conventions and 
secondly desired interpretation of treaty of Tirana”. It can be observed 
that, apart from the suggested order of priorities (ﬁrst the Nettuno Con-
ventions, and only then the Treaty of Tirana), the French had got it exactly 
right, for they addressed the substance of the Italo-Yugoslav problem, rather 
than its manifestations.
Chamberlain liked Briand’s proposal and informed Graham in Rome 
to that eﬀect. He also sent him a personal message to pass on to Mussolini, 
authorizing the British ambassador to make at his discretion any modiﬁca-
tions to the message if he considered it necessary. In this message he frankly 
informed Musssolini that as long the existing strained relations between 
Italy and Yugoslavia continued, there could be no guarantee that further 
incidents could not occur at any time. He was convinced, he continued, 
that the obvious and indeed the only cure was an “unconditional” dialogue 
between Italy and Yugoslavia, including the clariﬁcation of “the ambigu-
ous provisions of the treaty of Tirana”. And not only did Chamberlain 
urge Mussolini that these conversations should begin “as soon as possible”, 
 Chamberlain to Kennard,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Crewe to Chamberlain,  March , DBFP, No. .
 Chamberlain to Graham,  March , DBFP, No. . Graham felt free to 
change Chamberlain’s assessment of “the ambiguous provisions of the treaty of Tirana”, 
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he also suggested that Italy should be the country “to take the initiative in 
opening the discussions without imposing preliminary restrictions or con-
ditions”. This, of course, constituted potentially a big favour to Belgrade on 
the part of Britain, as Mussolini had consistently insisted that Yugoslavia 
should ﬁrst ratify the Nettuno Conventions. Indeed Chamberlain pressed 
this point. He argued that Yugoslavia should not be asked to make any pre-
liminary gesture with regard to the Nettuno Conventions which, as he cor-
rectly observed, “deal with matters entirely foreign to the question at issue”. 
To sweeten this bitter pill for Mussolini, Chamberlain undertook to ask the 
French to advise Belgrade to give Italy an undertaking that the Conven-
tions should be submitted to the Parliament “as part of a general settlement”. 
Beyond this, Chamberlain wrote to Mussolini, “it would be unreasonable to 
press the Yugoslav government”.
In other words, within days Chamberlain had reverted to his previ-
ous position of defending the Yugoslav case, and now more so then ever. 
The fact that the French had played a role in this makes little diﬀerence. 
They had not written his personal message to Mussolini, they had merely 
identiﬁed the main problem, leaving it to Chamberlain to articulate it most 
eloquently. Moreover, Chamberlain had thrown out Briand’s recommenda-
tion that the Nettuno Conventions should be made the starting point of 
discussions.
Most predictably, Mussolini did not embrace Chamberlain’s message 
with any enthusiasm – to say the least. During the night of  April Gra-
ham communicated Chamberlain’s missive to Mussolini. “His Excellency,” 
Graham telegraphed to his foreign secretary, “was in a diﬃcult mood. I did 
not expect him to relish message and he read it with ill concealed irritation.” 
In a dark mood indeed, il Duce told Graham that if the expectation existed 
that Belgrade should be oﬀered an explanation regarding the Pact of Tirana, 
“he would do nothing of the kind”, since the Pact was perfectly clear and 
required no explanation. But the British ambassador was not having any of 
this nonsense: “I said this was to put it mildly an exaggeration.” Graham 
even put this to Mussolini: there were points in the Pact of Tirana “which 
no one understood”, for example to what extent the provision to uphold 
Albania’s political, juridical and territorial status quo committed Italy to 
support Ahmed Zogu “personally in all circumstances?” Under attack, Mus-
solini produced an answer – of a kind. He said that in a country like Albania 
the chief of state meant the state itself; if Zogu were overthrown, his suc-
substituting this with words “including al outstanding between the two countries”, 
on the grounds that Mussolini had never seen anything ambiguous in the Treaty. See 
Graham to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. . 
 DBFP, No. .
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cessor would probably denounce various pacts, conventions, etc., between 
Italy and Albania, and this Italy could never tolerate. But Musssolini was 
also quick to say that if a successor to Zogu recognized the existing arrange-
ments, “that would be quite a diﬀerent matter”. This was, it has to be admit-
ted, opportunism of a very high order on the part of Mussolini. And then 
he played on British strategic sensitivities: Albania, he said, was as a vital 
point for Italy as were Gibraltar and Malta for Britain, and Italy could never 
allow Albania to fall into the hands or under the inﬂuence of potentially 
hostile powers such as Yugoslavia or Greece. In good measure, Mussolini 
tried to impress Graham with his statesmanship. Not so long ago, he told 
Graham, the former Yugoslav foreign minister Ninčić had proposed to him 
a partition of Albania, whereby Italy would get Valona, and Yugoslavia Scu-
tari. He, Musssolini, claimed that he had rejected this proposal. He also 
boasted that it was only his recent “pull of alarm bell” which had prevented 
an immediate European conﬂagration caused by Yugoslavia.
But Graham was far from convinced by the Italian dictator’s states-
manship. He openly told him that his attitude would cause Chamberlain 
“much disappointment”: the Yugoslavs sincerely desired the restoration of 
better relations, but if things were left as they were, there existed the dan-
ger of an incident at any moment. Mussolini did admit to Graham that 
the Albanian government had taken “meagre defensive measures” on the 
frontier against Yugoslavia, but was it really serious, he asked, that Albania 
would attack Yugoslavia? Equally, how could one believe that Italy contem-
plated aggression against Yugoslavia? In what was possibly a moment of 
carelessness, Mussolini said that, if Italy unfortunately did have to attack 
Yugoslavia, it would choose “a very diﬀerent line” for such an attack, leaving 
the rugged and inhospitable terrain of the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier well 
alone. What Graham also discovered was that Mussolini was absolutely 
furious with the French, complaining about the “virulent” French press, and 
about France concentrating large numbers of troops and tanks on the Ital-
ian frontier. “France,” he thundered, “endeavoured to thwart Italy at every 
turn.” Graham protested that Briand was doing all he possibly could at 
Belgrade, but privately concluded that it was this Mussolini’s irritation with 
France which may well have caused him, at least partly, to be diﬃcult over 
Yugoslavia. He then told his host in no uncertain terms that there seemed 
no alternative to the Italo-Yugoslav problem over Albania except to bring 
 Graham to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. . In fact, the Central Depart-
ment of the Foreign Oﬃce had recorded that Ninčić “had ﬂatly denied this.” Ibid., n. . 
According to a diﬀerent account, it was in fact Mussolini who had (probably in  ac-
cording to DBFP, No. , n. ) oﬀered Ninčić a division of Albania, but Ninčić refused 
this. See C. F. Melville, Balkan Racket (London: Jarrolds Publishers, n.d.; ca ), .
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the whole question to the League of Nations. Evidently getting fed up with 
his British guest, Mussolini now produced a characteristic outburst: “His 
Excellency replied,” Graham reported to Chamberlain, “that Albania was 
of such vital importance to Italy that not even the League of Nations could 
prevent her from defending legitimate interests there and if League at-
tempted to do so so much the worse for the League.”
So much for Mussolini’s view of the new world order. Nonetheless, 
this important meeting left Graham satisﬁed – up to a point. For he relent-
lessly kept pressing Mussolini on the question of the Pact of Tirana, being 
careful enough to emphasize that the immediate ratiﬁcation of the Nettuno 
Conventions “was not in the ﬁeld of practical politics”. Obviously tired, 
Mussolini ﬁnally gave in to this British diplomatic assault. He declared 
that if Rakić came to him with instructions from Belgrade asking either in 
a written note or verbally for explanations regarding the Pact of Tirana, he 
“was perfectly ready to give them”. Moreover, Mussolini added, if Rakić’s 
enquiry were couched in friendly terms, the answer would be in a similar 
spirit. Graham could hardly believe what he had just heard and jumped at 
this: was it the case, he asked Mussolini, that he “no longer insisted on a 
friendly gesture from Belgrade in the ﬁrst instance? Signor Mussolini re-
plied in the aﬃrmative”. This was, Graham reported modestly, all the result 
he could achieve, “but it may be a ﬁrst step”.
Not only in Rome, but also in Belgrade things appeared to be mov-
ing in a positive direction. Kennard informed Chamberlain on  April that 
Perić thought the ratiﬁcation of Nettuno Conventions “could be secured”, 
and also that, following Graham’s talk with Mussolini, he would send req-
uisite instructions to Rakić in Rome. Moreover, there was now agree-
ment between Italy and Yugoslavia that military oﬃcers (British, French 
and German) could inspect the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier if the occasion 
arose. Chamberlain himself deﬁned such an occasion: “(a) unrest on the 
frontier, or (b) allegations regarding military movements made by any of 
the governments concerned.” At the same time, clearly very encouraged 
by Graham’s recent account of his encounter with Mussolini, Chamberlain 
asked Kennard to tell Perić that Rakić should be given early instructions to 
approach Mussolini verbally on the lines suggested. Possibly lacking com-
 DBFP, No. .
 Ibid. Graham strongly recommended to Chamberlain that, should Rakić approach 
Mussolini on lines suggested, he should do so verbally and not in writing.
 Kennard to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP.
 Chamberlain to Crewe,  April , DBFP. On  April Kennard reported that he 
and his French and German colleagues had already constituted a committee and were 
examining the question of procedure. Ibid., n. .
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plete conﬁdence in Rakić’s diplomatic skills, he wanted Kennard to strongly 
urge the Yugoslav foreign minister that his man in Rome “should be guided 
by Sir R.Graham as to the time and manner of his representations”. What 
now complicated matters, however, was the panic that had set in Albania, or 
to be more precise, the fear that had gripped Ahmed Zogu himself. From 
Durazzo, Seeds informed Chamberlain that Zogu and his advisers were 
extremely unhappy at the prospect that Italian-Serbian conversations could 
redeﬁne the Treaty of Tirana in a way that could weaken the force of words 
“political and juridical status quo”. But Seeds was no fool. He explained to 
Chamberlain that the real meaning of these words was “support thereby 
given to Ahmed Bey personally”. The regime of Zogu, as the latter had 
openly confessed to Seeds, “might end rapidly” should Italy’s support be 
withdrawn, or even if the impression gained ground, especially among his 
political opponents, that this was going to happen.
In Rome, Graham shared the thinking of Seeds, which he passed on 
in a despatch to Chamberlain. He had talked to A. C. Bordonaro, the Sec-
retary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, the man whom 
Mussolini was about to send to London as the new ambassador. Bordonaro 
told Graham that Mussolini “was considerably upset” over Chamberlain’s 
message to him of  March – a piece of information that could hardly have 
been news to Graham. But Bordonaro also said to Graham that any weak-
ening of Italy’s support to Zogu “meant that latter would lose not only his 
position but probably his life”. Typically, the British diplomat was not going 
to shed tears over such a possibility. In the same despatch, Graham notiﬁed 
Chamberlain that Rakić had got the necessary instructions from Belgrade 
and therefore asked Mussolini whether he would be ready to begin conver-
sation with the Serbian minister. Il Duce, however, replied that he was tak-
ing a holiday and would not be ready until after Easter. And he could not 
resist telling Graham that, according to the information he had, Belgrade 
was already celebrating a diplomatic victory, but he was going to disillusion 
the Serbs. Very coldly, Graham commented that he would much regret “if 
His Excellency approached discussions in this frame of mind”, adding that 
the Yugoslav government seriously desired to arrive at a friendly under-
standing. Far from being overawed by Mussolini, Graham merely displayed 
polite contempt for a second-class power which Italy, despite all its preten-
sions under a Fascist dictator, had been and still remained.
 Chamberlain to Kennard,  April , DBFP, No. .
 Seeds to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. .
 Graham to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. . In Belgrade, Kennard disa-
greed about Mussolini’s claim about a Serb diplomatic victory. Ibid., n. .
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By now Graham had taken Rakić completely under his wing. It can even 
be argued that it was British diplomacy that was in important ways shap-
ing Yugoslavia’s troublesome relations with Italy. Graham had convinced 
Rakić to drop the idea of commencing talks with Mussolini by delivering 
a note – this, as has been seen, had already been agreed between Graham 
and Chamberlain. To start proceedings with a note would be “fatal” accord-
ing to Graham: the only result “would have been an exchange of mutually 
unsatisfactory notes which would have rendered further conversations dif-
ﬁcult if not impossible”. Graham noted with evident pleasure that, happily, 
no one was more persuaded of this than Rakić who had managed to obtain 
from a reluctant Belgrade government permission to proceed along the line 
suggested by Britain. Graham also gave Rakić a pep talk on the Italian posi-
tion: () Italy had secured by the Pact of Tirana a privileged position which 
it would not readily surrender; () whilst the Italians would probably give 
satisfactory general assurances regarding the Pact, it would be diﬃcult to 
induce them to oﬀer detailed explanations; () the interests of the Italians 
were bound up with Ahmed Zogu, and they would never willingly agree 
not to intervene on his behalf before he had been comfortably disposed of; 
and () the Italians would not consent to bring the question of Albania to 
the League of Nations, and although this could actually be forced on them, 
the result would put an end to all hope of friendly relations between Italy 
and Yugoslavia.
The interesting thing here was that France, generally believed to be 
Yugoslavia’s greatest ally, seemed in fact to be almost totally out of the pic-
ture. However, true gentleman that he was, Chamberlain had sent a private 
letter to Briand via De Fleuriau, the French ambassador to London, com-
menting on aspects of French policy. Briand replied in the same informal 
and conﬁdential manner, addressing his main points to Italo-Yugoslav rela-
tions. He wished to inform Chamberlain that the Yugoslav government 
were “in a state of great nervousness and were particularly suspicious of 
British policy. They thought that the British Government was helping and 
encouraging Signor Mussolini in an unfriendly policy to Yugo-Slavia”. 
Briand’s views were either hopelessly ignorant or malicious. This was not 
a comment on what Belgrade actually felt, it was a thinly disguised attack 
on the Foreign Oﬃce. Predictably, Chamberlain was less than impressed 
by this message, but kept his calm. For throughout the Italo-Yugoslav cri-
sis, he made sure to keep Paris informed about British policy. He told De 
Fleuriau, who had communicated to him Briand’s thoughts, that, surely, he, 
De Fleuriau, should know how he had spoken to him “with such frankness” 
about his communications with Italy, and that he should also know “how 
 Graham to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. .
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unjustiﬁed these suspicions were and how hard I had worked to help Yugo-
Slavia. I had in fact strained whatever inﬂuence I possessed with Mussolini 
to the very limit”.
Apart from not being able to resist pricking Chamberlain, the French 
were nevertheless seriously alarmed about the developments in the Bal-
kans. Nikola Uzunović’s government in Belgrade resigned on  April, to 
be succeeded by that of Velja Vukićević, with Vojislav Marinković as the 
new Foreign Minister. Two days earlier Italy issued an oﬃcial communiqué 
which stated that there could be no question of negotiations respecting the 
Treaty of Tirana, as this did not concern the Serb-Croat-Slovene state.
Clearly, the Italian position was hardening, and Mussolini had evidently 
and shamelessly lied to Graham during their conversation in Rome on  
April when he promised that he would give Milan Rakić a friendly inter-
pretation of the Treaty of Tirana. Now De Fleuriau hastened to see Orme 
Sargent in the Foreign Oﬃce, bringing along a fresh telegram from Briand. 
The latter believed that the change of government in Belgrade was due 
to the King who “intended that the new government, representing a deﬁ-
nite Serbian bloc without admixture of Croats or Slovenes, should adopt a 
ﬁrmer and bolder foreign policy than its predecessor”. De Fleuriau also told 
Sargent that, according to French reports from Belgrade, there were in the 
new government “elements” opposed to avoiding a war with Italy “on the 
ground that Italian military operations in Albania would be so unpopular 
as to undermine and possibly bring about the collapse of the whole Fascist 
regime”. Briand, according to De Fleuriau, trusted that the Yugoslavs would 
not really embrace “the fantastic belief ” that the régime in Italy could in any 
way suﬀer by a war over Albania. And Briand felt that Chamberlain was 
“the only person” able to inﬂuence Mussolini. He expressed the belief that, 
if Chamberlain threatened Mussolini by telling him that Britain would not 
countenance an Italian policy in Albania which could at any moment lead 
to war, Mussolini would back down.
However upset Chamberlain may have felt about the recent French 
criticisms of British policy, it did not really matter what Briand and the 
French thought or believed about London’s handling of the Italo-Yugoslav 
question. And Chamberlain could now feel the satisfaction that Paris was 
 Record by Sir A. Chamberlain of a conversation with the French Ambassador,  
April , DBFP, No. . Apart from French ignorance about British eﬀorts to help 
Belgrade, at this time Chamberlain also had a grievance towards Paris concerning lack 
of French support for British policy in China. Ibid., n. .
 Chamberlain to Graham,  April , DBFP, No. , n. .
 Record by Mr. Sargent of a conversation with the French Ambassador,  April , 
DBFP, No. .
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frankly investing all its hopes in the Foreign Oﬃce, implying that its inﬂu-
ence in Rome was practically non-existent. In the end it turned out that it 
was not a great power like France, nor indeed Chamberlain himself, but 
rather a relatively minor British diplomat who proved decisive in determin-
ing the ﬁnal outcome of the crisis. This was William Seeds. He wrote, on 
 April, what must be seen as a most important letter to Chamberlain, 
although the Foreign Oﬃce received it as late as  May. Seeds discussed 
the internal situation in Albania, amusing himself in particular with ob-
servations on Fan Noli, the former head of the Albanian government. “Fan 
Noli,” he reported to Chamberlain, “would be justiﬁed in adding the title 
of Prophet to his highly irregular dignity of ‘Bishop’ as he is apparently not 
without honour save within the frontiers of his own country.” Noli had 
given an interview to a newspaper in Vienna, in which he said that the 
Pact of Tirana was imposed on Albania by Italy and Britain, and that in 
the event of a war between Italy and Yugoslavia the Albanians would be 
ﬁghting on the side of Yugoslavia. Ahmed Bey, Noli added correctly, was 
thoroughly unpopular, maintaining his position only thanks to Italy. The 
existing situation in Albania, Seeds noted, was such that ambitious politi-
cians anticipated the forthcoming Italo-Serbian conversations weakening, 
“or of some more violent event wiping out, the regime of Ahmed Bey”. And 
this was precisely what worried Seeds. He was himself convinced that Italy 
would support Zogu “through thick and thin”, but there always existed the 
danger that some accident would deprive Albania of its present head. In this 
connection, Seeds referred to an unsuccessful plot against Zogu towards the 
end of March. And since, Seeds argued, Zogu’s enemies may believe that 
this was the time for action, “it is advisable to consider at any rate the pos-
sibility of Ahmed Bey’s disappearance, and its consequences”.
Seeds did not even try to hide his “warm regard” for Zogu, but placed 
his entire letter to Chamberlain in the context of “a serious calamity” that 
would be entailed by Zogu’s downfall. Ahmed Bey, he declared, was “ir-
replaceable”, no one else was ﬁt to step into his shoes. The only alterna-
tive person whom Seeds could identify was Musa Bey Juka, the minister 
of public works and previously the interior minister, but he thought that 
Juka’s personal unpopularity was a fatal obstacle. “Consequently,” Seeds 
wrote, “hopes of ﬁnding a suitable successor to Ahmed Bey – given Alba-
nian methods of régime-changing – must be founded on the mere possibil-
ity that out of the inevitable chaos and turmoil some outstanding though 
hitherto unrecognized personality may in time emerge. But parturition will 
be diﬃcult, and Albania would not be given useful help by her Italian and 
Serbian midwives whose eﬀorts will most probably result in the produc-
 Seeds to Chamberlain,  April , DBFP, No. .
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tion of twins cursed with a grievous incompatibility of temper and with no 
very sound constitutions.” In the past, Seeds observed, Albanian régimes 
alternated regularly between the adherents of Italy and Serbia. But now, he 
argued, conditions had completely changed: it was no longer a question of 
what Italy or Yugoslavia may hope to gain from a new president, “but quite 
deﬁnitely of what Italy may be almost certain to lose”. In Seeds’ view, the 
advantages that Zogu had promised the Serbs in return for returning him 
to power at the close of  were “paltry” in comparison with what Italy 
had since gained “and must preserve at all costs”. He thought that the ac-
tion which Italy would take in the event of a revolution against Zogu was 
“too obvious to discuss”. Seeds concluded his letter thus: “In Ahmed Bey 
the Italians have now a valuable and unique instrument; for no other man 
… possesses those personal qualities which can keep him in power without 
an unduly provocative display of Italian force. Should he disappear, there 
seems no present chance of either the Italians or the Serbians ﬁnding any 
candidate who would be much above puppet rank. The struggle between 
these puppets and their foreign supporters may, or may not, result in the 
extinction of Albania as an independent State, but bids fair in any event to 
mean the success of an individual dependent for his existence on very obvi-
ous alien bayonets.”
The impact of Seeds’ latest thinking on Chamberlain was truly 
considerable and is examined below. But on  April Signor Bordonaro 
handed Chamberlain a major memorandum by Mussolini on the subject of 
Italo-Yugoslav relations, dated  April. In this document il Duce accused 
Belgrade, for the umpteenth time, of “a decidedly anti-Italian tendency”, 
evident, he claimed, by “an intense military preparation”. He wrote, most 
vaguely, of “certain political and military circles in Yugoslavia possessing 
great inﬂuence, both open and secret”, something which constituted a grave 
danger to peace – but he named no one in particular. He went to contradict 
himself immediately, as “it now seems improbable … that Jugoslavia desires 
to persist in stimulating the proposed spring invasion of Albania”. And he 
persisted that any discussion concerning the Pact of Tirana was “absolutely 
inadmissible”. Staying on this subject, he wondered why Chamberlain at-
tached so much attention to the clause in which Italy declared its interest 
in the maintenance of the political status quo in Albania, a clause, he ob-
served, interpreted “as an obligation to support the present internal régime”. 
He added cynically: “Italy has no reasons of her own for interfering in the 
internal politics of the Albanian State,” whereas Yugoslavia desired to make 
Albania, practically, politically and perhaps territorially, a “vassal”. What-
ever Yugoslavia’s aims in Albania, it must have occurred to Chamberlain 
 Ibid.
Balcanica XXXVI232
that Mussolini was actually stating his own country’s ambitions in Albania 
for which there already existed all the evidence.
A few days later, Orme Sargent argued in a Foreign Oﬃce memo-
randum that Britain had no direct interest in Albania other than a general 
concern to prevent friction in Europe. This was of course stating the obvi-
ous. But Sargent also expressed scepticism about Mussolini, believing that 
in his conversation with Rakić (which still had not taken place) he would 
ﬂatly refuse to give assurances that the Treaty of Tirana did not endanger 
the independence of Albania and was not directed against Yugoslavia, or 
that he might argue that the Treaty entitled him to intervene in Albania 
in the support of the existing government against internal opposition and 
insurrection. “In these circumstances,” Sargent observed, “the Yugoslav gov-
ernment would be fully entitled to take the matter to the League.”
With regard to Seeds’ letter Chamberlain gave his comments not 
to hi man in Tirana, but to Graham in Rome in a letter dated  May. He 
referred to the memorandum which Mussolini had sent him on  April. 
And he did not hide his displeasure: “M. Mussolini, for the ﬁrst time, deﬁ-
nitely states in writing that he interprets Article I of the Treaty of Tirana 
as entitling him to interfere to protect and defend any friendly régime in 
Albania, not merely against foreign aggression, but presumably against in-
ternal opposition. This claim to interfere in the internal administration of 
Albania is precisely the claim which the Yugoslav Government have all 
along feared, and which they consider would constitute a threat to their own 
security by converting Albania from an independent country into an Italian 
protectorate … his Excellency now deﬁnes this claim in such a manner that 
it becomes impossible for me to treat it otherwise than as representing the 
oﬃcial and considered policy of the Italian Government.” And this, Cham-
berlain explained to Graham, put him “in a position of some diﬃculty”.
Chamberlain then outlined three possible courses open to him: () 
he could keep silent and reserve the right to protest if and when Italy took 
some action which could be held to constitute unjustiﬁable interference in 
the internal matters of Albania; () he could remind Mussolini that Britain 
was unable to accept or approve the present Italian claim; and () he could 
“tacitly acquiesce” in the Italian claim. The ﬁrst option did not appeal to 
Chamberlain since it could easily lead to trouble for Britain at a later date. 
The second option he at ﬁrst thought “the most consistent and logical”, 
but he also had to consider Mussolini’s possible violent reaction and, more 
importantly, if Belgrade found out about Britain’s rejection of Mussolini’s 
 DBFP, No. , enclosure.
 Memorandum by Mr. Sargent,  April , DBFP, No. . 
 Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham,  May , DBFP, No. .
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claims, it might encourage it to adopt an uncompromising attitude, and 
possibly lead to a fresh revolution in Albania.
He then addressed Seeds’ “very illuminating despatch”. He explained 
that he had always held that Britain had no direct interest in Albania, and 
that the only reason he wanted to see Italy’s penetration in Albania conﬁned 
within certain limits was that, if such penetration were unlimited, it would 
arouse the fear of neighbouring states and thereby endanger peace. What 
Seeds had convinced him of, however, was that the factor which was even 
more likely to endanger peace would be the disappearance of Ahmed Bey 
and his government since: “Should Ahmed Bey disappear, the result is likely 
to be civil war, during which Albania as a separate State might cease to exist 
or become subject to a puppet Government still more dependent on foreign 
bayonets than the present one … Were His Majesty’s Government now 
to veto M. Mussolini’s policy of supporting Ahmed’s Government against 
both internal and external aggression, and were he subsequently to be over-
thrown, it is not diﬃcult to foresee the Italian arguments whereby His Maj-
esty’s Government would be held responsible for the resulting chaos and 
the consequent damage to vital Italian interests, and even for the eventual 
conﬂict between Italy and Yugoslavia.”
Chamberlain also enclosed a memorandum addressed to Mussolini 
– a sickening piece of work in which he bent over backwards to make con-
ciliatory statements to the Italian dictator, concluding thus: “I take note 
with particular satisfaction of the very frank and precise assurances with 
which Signor Mussolini’s message concludes, namely, that the situation cre-
ated by the Ambassadors’ Conference resolution of  and by the Treaty 
of Tirana guarantees the independence of Albania and does not threaten in 
the least Jugoslavia or any other State bordering upon Albania; that Italy 
casts no aggressive glances either in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic or 
elsewhere; and lastly, that Italy will do nothing which might disturb the 
peace of Europe. It is so that I have throughout understood and interpreted 
his policy.” When Briand met Chamberlain at the Foreign Oﬃce and 
enquired about Italo-Yugoslav relations, to his credit Chamberlain at least 
replied that “one could never speak conﬁdently about so temperamental a 
person as Signor Mussolini”.
The question thus arises: did Chamberlain actually decisively shift 
Britain’s policy towards the Albanian rift between Italy and Yugoslavia? 
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid., enclosure.
 Record by Sir A. Chamberlain of a conversation with M. Briand at the Foreign Oﬃce 
on  May, , DBFP, No. .
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And the answer, surely, is that he did not do so in any meaningful sense. 
As he and his diplomats kept endlessly repeating, Britain had no inter-
est in Albania except to keep the country paciﬁed lest Britain found itself 
involved in a crisis, or a conﬂict which served her no purpose whatsoever. 
Here, Britain was actually more suspicious of France with her Little En-
tente system than of Italy. And, if anything, as the records show, the Foreign 
Oﬃce was far more frequently backing Yugoslav complaints against Italy 
than the other way round. In this case at least, it was not the case what Pro-
fessor Slobodan Jovanović told William Strang, the young British diplomat 
at Belgrade in the early s: “No allied country, he said, had been more 
generously friendly to Jugoslavia than Great Britain, and no allied country 
politically so hostile.” What so frightened Chamberlain in May  was 
the possibility that Zogu could easily be removed, that no suitable replace-
ment could be found for him, and that a Balkan conﬂagration could ensue, 
something which Britain absolutely wanted to avoid. This was sheer prag-
matism on Britain’s part, hardly a change of policy. It should be remembered 
that Britain’s rejection of the Geneva Protocol in  had created the es-
sential basis for her postwar international behaviour: avoid all foreign com-
mitments at all costs unless your own direct interests are under threat. And 
it is wrong to argue that the Treaty of Tirana was made possible by British 
acquiescence: “Having just blocked any substantial Italian gains at the ex-
pense of Ethiopia and Turkey, Britain was glad enough to allow Mussolini a 
little balm for his ego in Albania which, from  on, had been recognized 
by the Conference of Ambassadors as a special Italian sphere of interest.”
Indeed, it was precisely the Treaty of Tirana which conﬁrmed an already 
existing state of aﬀairs between Italy and Albania, and British preoccupa-
tions in Ethiopia and Turkey had nothing to do with it: they were entirely 
separate issues with entirely separate possible consequences. Britain was an 
imperial power with vast interests in the Near and Middle East. She had 
had no pretensions in the Adriatic at least since the Napoleonic period.
And thus the almost hysterical Italo-Yugoslav crisis over Albania in 
the spring of  soon petered out. Yugoslav-Albanian relations deterio-
rated further, with diplomatic relations being broken oﬀ in June , only 
to be restored again in August. But Yugoslavia, economically and militar-
ily far weaker than Italy, had long since lost Albania which now became 
Italy’s satellite state in all but name, this being a state of aﬀairs which in 
reality represented merely “a political technicality” at least since the Treaty 
 Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch, ), .
 Marks, The Illusion of Peace, .
 See Mirko Avakumović, Prekid i obnova diplomatskih odnosa između Kraljevine Srba, 
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of Tirana. Which, it may be argued, was just as well. As a contemporary 
British observer wrote, the “Albanians have given convincing proof that 
they are unﬁtted to govern themselves, whereas a protectorate would result 
in bringing peace to a distracted land”.
The rest of the story is well-known. Zogu made himself King in 
, thus rounding oﬀ his somewhat cinematic career. But there existed 
no constitutional monarchy in Albania to speak of. He made attempts to 
modernize his country, whilst in foreign policy he pretended to be indepen-
dent of Italy – a claim that fooled no one. And it was the rivalry between 
Mussolini and Hitler that ultimately decided the fate of Zogu and Albania. 
The Germans marched into Prague in March , an action that threw il
Duce into an infantile mood and, inﬂuenced by his foreign minister Conte 
Ciano, he sent his troops to occupy Albania in April, a military operation 
not particularly distinguished by its brilliance, but nevertheless successfully 
completed by the middle of April when the crown of Albania was oﬀered to 
the Italian King Victor Emmanuel. Zogu went to exile, rumoured to carry 
,, in treasure.
After the Second World War Tito’s Yugoslavia brieﬂy asserted some 
inﬂuence over Tirana, but the People’s Albania preferred to try other ver-
sions of the Socialist experiment – ﬁrst Soviet, then Chinese – before set-
tling on her own isolationist and famously paranoid model.
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